The World Cup Becomes an Investment Asset

The World Cup has long been a multibillion-dollar business. FIFA now wants to open part of that business directly to private capital for the first time. President Gianni Infantino calls the plan a democratization of football. His critics see a historic breach of principle — and fear that future tournament decisions will be shaped not only by sporting interests, but also by investors’ expectations of financial returns.

A new company for FIFA’s global business

Football’s international governing body plans to establish a new subsidiary that would bring together large parts of its commercial operations.

FIFA Forward Enterprise, or FFE, would market and help operate FIFA’s most important competitions, including the men’s and women’s World Cups, the Club World Cup and youth tournaments.

Revenue from broadcasting rights, sponsorships, ticket sales and licensing would flow into the new company. FFE would also assume responsibility for substantial parts of tournament operations.

FIFA says it would retain full control of the subsidiary. Decisions involving competition rules, tournament formats, the international match calendar and other sporting matters would formally remain with the governing body.

What would change is that private investors could acquire an economic interest in the business.

Up to $4.2 billion in fresh capital

FIFA has initially valued the proposed subsidiary at approximately $20 billion. External investors could acquire noncontrolling minority stakes totaling up to 20 percent.

The transaction could raise as much as $4.2 billion during 2026. JPMorgan is advising FIFA on the plans. Thrive Eternal, an investment vehicle linked to US technology investor Joshua Kushner, is reportedly expected to become a leading investor.

Kushner is the younger brother of Jared Kushner, the son-in-law and former adviser of US President Donald Trump. The family connection adds a political dimension because Infantino has maintained conspicuously close relations with Trump for years.

The negotiations are not yet complete. The FIFA Council and a majority of the organization’s 211 national member associations would still need to approve the structure.

For now, the project remains a proposal — but one that could fundamentally change the financial architecture of global football.

What investors would actually be buying

Formally, FIFA would be selling neither the World Cup nor control over the sport.

Investors would acquire minority stakes in a company responsible for organizing and monetizing the commercial activities surrounding FIFA tournaments. They would not be able to decide offside rules, tournament sizes or match schedules directly.

Economically, however, they would gain exposure to some of the most valuable rights in international sports.

The World Cup generates revenue from:

• global television and streaming rights,
• sponsorship agreements,
• ticket sales,
• hospitality packages,
• licensed products,
• digital content,
• advertising,
• and data monetization.

Every additional match, sponsor and media market could potentially increase the value of the new company.

That is why critics question whether sporting decisions and financial interests can remain completely separate over the long term.

Investors would not need a formal vote on expanding a tournament in order to benefit from the additional revenue it generated.

UEFA says a red line has been crossed

European football’s governing body has reacted with unusual force.

Football’s governance and soul are not commodities, UEFA said. Nobody owns the game, and FIFA therefore has no right to sell it. European officials have also criticized the lack of transparency surrounding the potential investors and the parties that could ultimately profit from the structure.

People close to UEFA reportedly described the proposal as an “atomic bomb” for football.

The language is dramatic, but it captures the essence of the dispute. The conflict is not merely about the size of an investment. It is about who owns the economic value created by a global sporting event.

FIFA views its tournament rights as assets whose commercial potential can be developed more aggressively.

UEFA argues that those rights have merely been entrusted to FIFA for administration on behalf of the sport and should not be transformed into an investment vehicle without a much broader debate.

Infantino promises $10 billion for football

FIFA is defending the plan with an ambitious development pledge.

Over the next four years, the organization intends to direct a total of $10 billion into football. The funding would support infrastructure projects, coaching programs, national teams, women’s football, youth competitions and grassroots development.

Regular distributions under the FIFA Forward program could rise from the current $8 million to as much as $20 million for each national association during the 2027–2030 funding cycle.

FIFA has also indicated that each of its 211 member associations could gain voluntary access to up to $20 million in one-time capital through the new financing model.

Infantino therefore describes the project as a global democratization of football. Smaller and financially weaker associations, in particular, could receive substantially more money.

That is not merely a moral argument.

It is also a highly effective political one.

Member associations stand to gain

Major changes within FIFA are not decided by UEFA or the wealthiest national leagues alone. Each of the organization’s 211 national associations generally has one vote in the FIFA Congress.

Germany does not possess more formal voting power than a small island nation.

By offering every member association substantially higher payments or access to one-time capital, FIFA is creating a broad group of direct financial beneficiaries.

For a small federation, $20 million could finance a national training center, stadium renovations or several youth development programs. At the same time, such funding could make the association heavily dependent on continued payments from Zurich.

FIFA calls this redistribution.

Critics see a system through which Infantino can organize political support for his commercial and institutional agenda.

Both interpretations may be true at the same time.

Private capital changes the incentives

Financial investors do not provide billions of dollars out of enthusiasm for amateur football.

They expect the value of their stake to increase and ultimately want to generate a return through future distributions, a resale or another exit.

FIFA has not fully explained how those returns would be generated. The governing body says the net benefits of the new company would be reinvested in football. Yet the model must also be financially attractive enough to persuade private investors to commit several billion dollars.

That tension remains unresolved.

Investors may primarily be betting on an increase in the value of their shares. If media, sponsorship and ticket revenue continue to grow, FFE could command a significantly higher valuation in a future transaction.

That would create permanent pressure for expansion.

A company valued at $20 billion must demonstrate that its revenue can continue to rise.

In football, growth often means more matches, larger tournaments, higher ticket prices, more sponsorship inventory and additional media products.

Could World Cups become even larger?

FIFA explicitly says private investors would have no influence over the match calendar or tournament formats.

The concern that competitions could continue to expand is nevertheless not unfounded.

The 2026 men’s World Cup was the first to feature 48 teams and 104 matches. The Club World Cup was also expanded to 32 teams. Both decisions created additional games and therefore more opportunities to sell media rights, tickets and sponsorship packages.

A high valuation for the new company could increase the commercial pressure to stage even larger or more frequent tournaments in the future.

That would not necessarily require direct instructions from investors.

It would be a structural incentive.

When the value of a company depends on the number and reach of its events, decisions about tournament formats will inevitably be evaluated partly through a commercial lens.

Players and clubs already complain about an overloaded calendar. A new phase of commercialization could intensify that conflict.

FIFA is selling part of its future revenue

Economically, the proposed model resembles the partial advance monetization of future income.

FIFA would receive several billion dollars immediately. In return, it would transfer a share of the company holding its future commercial revenue to private investors.

That would provide the governing body with substantial capital in the short term.

Over the longer term, however, part of the company’s future value would no longer belong solely to FIFA and its member associations. It would also accrue to the private shareholders.

That makes the $20 billion valuation crucial.

If the valuation is generous, FIFA would receive a large amount of capital in exchange for a relatively small stake. But if revenue grows much faster than expected, investors could ultimately secure the more profitable side of the transaction.

For them, the World Cup represents an extraordinary asset: a globally established brand, exceptionally high barriers to entry, recurring events and an audience of billions.

There is effectively no competing second World Cup.

A valuation carrying political risks

As attractive as the opportunity may appear, it also comes with highly unusual risks.

FIFA’s revenue is not generated evenly from year to year. It remains heavily concentrated around men’s World Cup cycles. Tournament cancellations, boycotts, political disputes or weaker media markets could significantly reduce income.

Minority investors would also appear to receive only limited influence. FIFA intends to retain sole authority over regulation, tournament formats and the calendar.

Investors would therefore commit billions to a company whose most important decisions would remain in the hands of an international association and its 211 members.

Analysts have consequently identified irregular revenue, weak minority shareholder rights and substantial political controversy as major uncertainties surrounding the model.

This would not be a conventional private-equity transaction.

The investment’s value would depend not only on revenue and profitability, but also on sporting decisions, public acceptance and the conduct of an organization that regularly attracts controversy.

An old plan in a new structure

This is not the first time Infantino has explored opening FIFA competitions to private investors.

In 2018, he pursued a multibillion-dollar deal involving an expanded Club World Cup and a new global Nations League. At the time, the proposed investment was reported to be worth as much as $25 billion.

The initiative collapsed amid resistance within FIFA and questions about the identities and influence of the proposed financial backers.

The new structure is broader and politically more sophisticated.

It combines private investment with the promise that all member associations will benefit financially. FIFA would also formally retain full control over sporting matters.

Infantino is therefore addressing two of the main criticisms raised in 2018:

Possible investors are being identified, and national federations are being offered substantial financial incentives of their own.

The fundamental question remains unchanged.

How much influence should private capital be allowed to acquire over competitions regarded as a common asset of world football?

Infantino’s own future comes into focus

The proposed transaction also raises questions about Infantino’s personal role.

Under the current interpretation of FIFA’s statutes, his presidency is expected to end no later than 2031. Media reports have suggested that he could subsequently assume a leadership position at the new company, possibly as chief executive or commissioner.

FIFA says no discussions about such a future role have taken place.

At the same time, the organization argues that FIFA’s leadership would need to retain a central position within FFE to ensure that control remained consistent with the governing body’s statutes.

That creates at least the appearance of a structure that could extend Infantino’s influence beyond his presidency.

Critics are therefore demanding full transparency regarding management, ownership, executive compensation and investors’ eventual exit rights.

This is about more than commercialization

Football has long been commercialized.

Broadcasting rights are sold for billions. Clubs are owned by investment funds, sovereign wealth funds and billionaires. Stadiums carry corporate names, and ticket prices increasingly reflect market demand.

The FIFA plan would nevertheless cross a different institutional boundary.

For the first time, private investors would acquire a direct economic interest in the centralized business model of football’s global governing body. Their returns would be linked to revenue generated by the world’s most important national-team competitions.

Until now, FIFA has sold individual rights to broadcasters, sponsors and commercial partners.

Under the new model, it could sell part of the company that permanently manages all of those rights.

SK